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FuTuRE lNTERESTs-RuLE As To REMOTENESS OF VESTING IN CAL1FORNIA-

T devised the income of a trust to his unmarried daughter for life. If at her death
there were living issue of the daughter, the income was to be distributed to such
issue until 24 years after T's death. The trust was then to terminate, unless issue,
who had been living at T's death, should survive the 24-year period, in which
event the income was to continue to be distributed until the death of such issue.
It was further provided, "if my said daughter survives me, but at the time of her
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death leaves no issue of hers then living, the trust shall at the time of her death
terminate. ..."1 On termination of the trust, gifts in remainder were limited to
surviving children of the life tenant, to surviving issue of deceased children, to
surviving named relatives and friends, and to surviving issue of those deceased.
If none of these distributees or their children were living at the time of distribution, T's heirs were to take the co'rpus. The probate court found the entire trust
invalid because non-separable gifts in remainder violated both the common law
rule against perpetuities and the statutory rules prohibiting restraints on alienation.
On appeal, held, reversed. Although the contingent remainders did not violate the
statutory rule against restraints on alienation,2 all contingent remainders except
those to named relatives and friends were void under the common law rule against
perpetuities, which is in force in California.3 However, the valid portions of the
trust are separable from the void ones. In re Sahlender's Estate, (Cal. App. 1948),
_201 P. (2d) 69.
.
Because of the uncertain meaning of the word _"perpetuity" when the California constitutional prohibition of perpetuities was adopted in 1849, it seems
clear that this provision was not intended to embody the common law rule against
perpetuities. Probably it was just a general statement of policy against tying up
estates for long periods.4 · The common law rule against perpetuities became a part
of the law of California in 1850, when the state formally adopted the English
common law. 5 Most__authorities agree that the statutory rules enacted in 1872
were intended to supplant the common law rule against perpetuities, and not, as
the principal case holds. to codify a rule against restraints on alienation, leaving the
common law intact. 6 The current status of California law as to the existence of
any general rule against remoteness of vesting remains uncertain, in spite of the
holding in the principal case. Much early dicta supports the view that the statutes
have displaced the common law rule against perpetuities.7 There is no judicial
support,-however, for the view that these statutes enact a broad rule against remotenessof vesting. 8 There are now two decisions at the intermediate appellate
1 Principal case at 72 (italics added).
2Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941) §§715, 716.
3 The court stated that the common law rule was in force by reason of either Cal. Const.
(1849), art. XI, §16; Cal. Const. (1879), art. XX, §9, which prohibits "perpetuities"; or Cal.
Political Code (Deering 1944) §4468, which makes the common law of England the rule
of decision in California.
_4 See 2 SIMES, FuTURE INTERESTS, §§479, 572 (1936); 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
appendix, c. B, 30 (1944 );· Buray, "The Meaning of the California Constitutional Provision
Prohibiting Perpetuities," 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 107 (1928).
5 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §572 (1936).
6 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, appendix, c. B, §§3, 4 (1944); GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, §§747, 752 (1942); 2 SIMES, FUTuRE INTERESTS, §565 (1936). See also
Rodev v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937).
7 Blakeman v. Miller, 136 Cal. 138, 68 P. 587 (1902).
8 California has substantially the same statutory provisions as those used by New York
and Oklahoma as the basis for a broad rule against remoteness of vesting. See 4 PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, appendix, c. A, §§11, 12; appendix, c. B, §11 (1944); Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941) §§770, 773, 776. Sec. 776 states, "A contingent remainder cannot be created on
a term of years, unless the nature 'of the contingency on which it is limited is such that the
remainder must vest in interest during the continuance or at the termination of lives in being
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level, both relying on dictum in Re McCray, 9 that the common law rule against
perpetuities is in force in California.10 The Supreme Court of California has not
yet authoritatively passed on the question, and its most recent dictum expresses
doubt. 11 Even assuming that the common law rule is in force in California, the
decision in the principal case holding some of the contingent remainders invalid
seems erroneous. The law is well settled that whe)l a settler or testator separately
states two or more contingencies or events and limits property differently and
alternatively on these events, the validity of each limitation under the rule against
perpetuities must be judged independently.12 If property is limited to B on the
occurrence of either event X or event Y (separately stated), and event Xis remote
but event Y is not, the limitation will take effect if event Y, the valid contingency,
occurs. 13 The principal case dearly falls within the above rule or rules, the italicized portion of the will (stated supra) being a valid separately stated contingency.
If T's daughter dies leaving no surviving issue, the valid contingency will have
occurred and the contingent remainders in the will should be valid. Only if one
of the other stated contingencies happens, should the contingent remainders be
held void under the rule against perpetuities.14
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at the creation of such a remainder." One reason for the court's reluctance to use this section
in the principal case is its doubt as to whether the statute had been intentionally left unaffected by the 1917 amendment to sec. 715, which changed the allowable period specified
therein from lives in being to lives in being or twenty-five years. In New York, where the
provisions originated, the allowable periods in both statutes are the same. See N. Y. Real
Property Laws (McKinney, 1945) §§42, 46. If the common law rule is in force in California,
and if sec. 776 is literally applied, a draftsman will be in the unenviable position of having to
comply with overlapping rules specifying three different allowable periods.
o 204 Cal. 399, 268 P. 647 (1928).
10 Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 541, 114 P. (2d) 646 (1941); the principal
case.
11 In re Micheletti's Estate, 24 Cal. (2d) 904, 151 P. (2d) 833 (1944).
12Leach, "Perpetuities In A Nutshell," 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 at 654, 657 (1938); 2
SxMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§521, 531 (1936); GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,
H341-354 (1942); 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §376(c) (1944); Goring v. Howard, 16
Sim. 395, 60 Eng. Rep. 926 (1848). This rule has been held applicable to analogous situations
under the statutory rules against restraints on alienation in New York, In re Schwarnrn's Estate,
53 N.Y.S. (2d) 654 (1945); and in California, In re Troy's Estate, 214 Cal. 53, 3 P. (2d) 930
(1931). It would probably be applied in cases arising under Cal. Civil Code (Deering, 1941)
§776, discussed supra, note 8.
13Longhead v. Phelps, 2 W. Bl. 704, 96 Eng. Rep. 414 (1770); Miles v. Harford, 12
Ch. D. 691 (1879); GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§341-354 (1942). See In re
Irving Trust Company, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 824 (1946), applying the doctrine under the statutory rule against restraints on alienation. In California, the recent case of In re Gump's
Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 535, 107 P. (2d) 17 (1940), indicates that though the California
Supreme Court may not talk in terms of the rule of severability, it will reach a decision in
accord with that rule.
14 In cases involving separable limitations, one of which is valid, courts have differed
in the form of their decisions, though not in their substantive results. Thus the decision in
Re Schwamm's Estate, 53 N.Y.S. (2d) 654 (1945), stated that since one of the alternative
provisions was valid, the validity of the questioned provision would not be adjudicated until
it happened, this question, until then, being premature. In California, the supreme court in
an identical situation handed down what was in fact a declaratory judgment holding certain
alternative contingencies invalid, and rewriting the will with these provisions stricken out.
In re Troy's Estate, 214 Cal. 53, 3 P. (2d) 930 (1931).

